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Lois G. Schworer

Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1990), 531-548.

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Journal of the History of Ideas

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Lois G. Schwoerer

The role and significance of John Locke's political ideas in English history and the part Locke played in English politics have been reinterpreted during the past twenty years or so. Thanks to the work of John Dunn, Peter Laslett, Martyn Thompson, John Kenyon, Richard Ashcraft, and others, we now have a different understanding of the argument, dating, and reception of *Two Treatises* and of the role Locke played in the politics of the 1680s.¹ Notwithstanding all this—and other—excellent work on Locke, there remains a central question respecting him and the Glorious Revolution, which, if not entirely neglected, still invites attention.² It is Locke's response to and activities in the Revolution, a question that includes consideration of the correspondence between Locke's theories about government and his actions and comments, and between his ideas and those expressed in debate and contemporary tracts. Recently "rediscovered" material—an account of a debate and some papers that Locke wrote in 1690 and 1695, the one respecting the Oaths controversy and the other his thoughts on Old England's legal constitution—permits a fuller answer than has yet been offered, although, admittedly, even when this new material is joined to well-known sources, the

The author thanks Gordon J. Schochet for his comments on a draft of this essay.

¹ John Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke. An Historical Account of the Argument of the Two Treatises of Government* (Cambridge, 1969); J. P. Kenyon, *Revolution Principles The Politics of Party 1689-1720* (Cambridge, 1977); Peter Laslett (ed.), *John Locke: Two Treatises of Government* (Cambridge, 1967) (all references to Locke's *Second Treatise* are to this edition); Martyn Thompson, "The Reception of Locke's Two Treatises of Government 1690-1705," *Political Studies*, 24 (1976), 184-91; Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government* (Cambridge, 1986).

² Bibliographers have identified nine essays from 1907 to 1967 that considered some aspect of Locke and the Glorious Revolution: Roland Hall and Roger Woolhouse, *80 Years of Locke Scholarship. A Bibliographical Guide* (Edinburgh, 1983), and Jean S. and John Yolton, *John Locke. a reference guide* (Boston, 1985).

evidence remains fragmentary.³ Still, the question is worth pursuing. At the present time scholars have virtually removed Locke and Lockean ideas from a role in the Glorious Revolution. I want to argue that both the man and his ideas had some part to play.

The Glorious Revolution involved three basic issues: who should be king of England? What should be the nature of the kingship or in what ways should the government be reformed? And what should be the relationship between the Anglican Church and other Protestant groups? Also important was the question of the nature of the Convention, that is, the body irregularly elected in January 1689 to settle the nation's affairs. Underlying these issues were theoretical questions concerning succession theory, allegiance, consent, conscience, and the concepts of trust and original contract. A central problem was: did the people, however, the word was defined, have the right to resist the king, and if so, on what grounds and through what agency?

Locke responded to these questions in ways that reflected both his theoretical principles and his practical, partisan, political experiences. During the years when he was Shaftesbury's confidant and political agent (1667 to 1682), Locke learned about practical politics and the political uses of the press through personal involvement.⁴ In 1682 and 1683 he drifted with Shaftesbury and others into the murky shadows of conspiratorial politics and found the dangers there so great that he fled to Holland in September 1683, where he lived in self-imposed exile until February 1689. In both England and Holland Locke formed connections with radical Whigs and with men who, although in some cases infected earlier with radicalism, became court Whigs in the course of the Revolution.⁵ As I have shown elsewhere, some of the "first Whigs" played a prominent role in the Revolution.⁶ Among them was John Somers, a leader of the Convention and the chairman of one of two committees that drafted the Declaration of Rights. Somers, Edward Clarke, John Freke (both Whig

³ James Farr and Clayton Roberts, "John Locke on the Glorious Revolution: A Rediscovered Document," *The Historical Journal*, 28 (1985), 385-98; Lois G. Schwoerer, "A Journall of the convention at Westminster begun the 22 of January 1688/9," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 49 (1976), 242-63 (hereafter, *BIHR*). Also I wish to lay claim to having "rediscovered" John Locke, "Old England's Legal Constitution," in the Public Record Office (hereafter P.R.O.), PRO 30/24/47/6, which was largely printed in H. R. Fox-Bourne, *Life of John Locke* (2 vols.; London, 1969; reprt. of 1876 issue), II, 317-24, but has since then been ignored. References are to the manuscript.

⁴ For a narrative of Locke's life, see Maurice Cranston, *John Locke, A Biography* (London, 1957). For the press see Laslett (ed.), *Locke's Two Treatises of Government*, 26-27; K. H. D. Haley, *The First Earl of Shaftesbury* (London, 1968), 390-96, and Mark Goldie, "John Locke and Anglican Royalism," *Political Studies*, 31 (1983), 67.

⁵ Mark Goldie, "The Roots of True Whiggism 1688-94," *History of Political Thought*, 1 (1980), 220, dates the shift of such men as of February 6, 1689.

⁶ Lois G. Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights, 1689* (Baltimore, 1981), chs. 2 and 3; app. 3.

lawyers), and Sir Walter Yonge (formerly one of Shaftesbury's lieutenants in the House of Commons) were among the men who later gave Locke access to the Convention and subsequent parliaments. Locke's friends among advanced Whigs included Robert Ferguson, a Presbyterian minister and pamphleteer, and Major John Wildman, a republican, who served on one of the "rights" committees in the Convention. Intellectuals in Holland whose liberal views on religious toleration coincided with Locke's were Philippus van Limborch and Jean Le Clerc (Nonconformist theologians at the Remonstrants seminary at Amsterdam) and Benjamin Furly, a radical Quaker, with whom Locke lived for a while.⁷ It seems clear, as Ashcraft has forcefully argued and shown in detail, that Locke should be placed in a circle that in the 1670s and 1680s included political and religious dissidents in both England and Holland. To say as much, however, is not to suggest that all features of Locke's political theories were radical.⁸

Locke was also drawn to the periphery of the Dutch court of Prince William of Orange. In addition to Furly, Charles, Viscount Mordaunt, who had been one of Shaftesbury's supporters in the House of Lords in 1679-81 and was said to be the "first man of quality" to try to persuade the Prince to come to England, provided a link to William.⁹ Locke may have met the Prince in 1687 on visits he made to The Hague.¹⁰ Using his influence, Mordaunt secured a passage for Locke on the boat carrying Princess Mary to England; and after the Revolution, when he was rewarded with high office, he advanced Locke's interests, arranging for King William to offer Locke several posts in the government. Excusing himself on grounds of poor health, Locke decline the major assignments, but over the years the offers continued, an indication that men in high places thought well of Locke as a man of practical acumen.¹¹ Although Locke and Dr. Gilbert Burnet, later Bishop of Salisbury and in 1688 William's chief propagandist, were not friends, they were surely acquainted. Further, Burnet corresponded with Locke's friends, Limborch and Le Clerc, and a letter from Locke to Limborch in April 1689 proves at least a speaking acquaintanceship with Burnet.¹² The fact that a major polemic by Burnet, *An Enquiry into the Measures of Submission to the Supream Authority*, printed in October 1688 to justify the Prince's actions,

⁷ Cranston, *John Locke*, 280-81.

⁸ Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics*, esp. ch. 4.

⁹ H. C. Foxcroft (ed.), *A Supplement to Burnet's History of My Own Time* (Oxford, 1902), 287-88; Gilbert Burnet, *History of His Own Time*, ed. with notes by the Earls of Dartmouth and Hardwicke *et al.* (6 vols.; Oxford, 1833), III, 261-62.

¹⁰ Cranston, *John Locke*, 284.

¹¹ E. S. De Beer, "John Locke: the Appointment Offered to Him in 1698," *BIHR*, 40 (1967), 213-19.

¹² Cranston, *John Locke*, 286; E. S. De Beer (ed.), *The Correspondence of John Locke* (8 vols.; Oxford, 1976-89), III, 596-601, esp. 597.

contained language and arguments that were close to those in Locke's *Two Treatises* permits the thought that he and Locke discussed them, although Burnet retreated almost immediately from those ideas.¹³ There is no evidence to support the view of Locke's nineteenth-century biographer that Locke "had much to say" about the arrangements for William's invasion.¹⁴ Still it is not credible that men close to the Prince and formerly close to Shaftesbury should never have solicited the opinion of the man whom Shaftesbury valued so highly.

Locke's response to the Revolution also reflected the political and religious principles that he had worked out before 1688-89 in *Two Treatises of Government*, drafted first in 1679-80, and the *Epistola de tolerantia*, written first in 1685-86 but indebted to his earlier work on toleration.¹⁵ The ideas in Locke's private papers were not unique. Earlier treatises on government had anticipated many of them. For example, George Lawson's *Politica Sacra et Civilis*, first printed in 1660, arguably exerted great influence on Locke.¹⁶ Locke's political and religious ideas also corresponded to notions appearing in print from 1680 through 1683¹⁷ and, as will be discussed, in 1688-89.

Despite friends' repeated urging,¹⁸ Locke did not return to England until February 12, 1689, so it is impossible that he exerted in *person* any influence either on the events of December and January or on the revolutionary settlement in February. But Locke kept himself informed of the mounting hostility to James II's policies through correspondence, gazeteers; and visitors; and before and after his return he attempted to exercise influence by letters, memoranda, oral advice, and printed treatises. In 1689 Locke, echoing Machiavelli's comment to the Medici when he proffered them his *Discorsi*, offered King William the most precious thing he owned—his knowledge of the "constitutions of my country, the temper of my Country men and the divisions and interest amongst

¹³ Julian H. Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty: Mixed Monarchy and the Right of Resistance in the Political Thought of the English Revolution* (Cambridge, 1978), app. II. Burnet's tract, drafted in 1687 for Princess Mary, was revised and printed in Holland in October 1688: H. C. Foxcroft and T. E. S. Clarke, *A Life of Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury* (London, 1907), 244, and *A Supplement to Burnet's History*, ed. Foxcroft, 286.

¹⁴ Fox-Bourne, *Life of John Locke*, II, 56-57.

¹⁵ Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government*, 490-96.

¹⁶ A. J. McLean, "George Lawson and John Locke," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 9 (1947), 69-77; Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty*, esp. ch. 3.

¹⁷ In addition to Ashcraft's study, see O. W. Furlley, "The Whig Exclusionists: Pamphlet Literature in the Exclusion Campaign," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 13 (1957), 19-36; and B. Behrens, "The Whig theory of the Constitution in the Reign of Charles II," *Ibid.*, 7 (1941), 42-71.

¹⁸ De Beer (ed.), *The Correspondence of John Locke*, III, 530-32. Also, Cranston, *John Locke*, 292.

[them],”¹⁹ a formulation, significantly, that recognized his theoretical and practical political expertise.

What, then, were Locke’s responses to the basic issues that lay at the heart of the Revolution of 1688-89? Locke’s view of the Convention in part reflected principles set out in his *Two Treatises*, in part his practical political sense. He looked upon the Convention as “something of an other nature” from a “formall Parliament,” with the power to mend the “great frame of government,” as a regular parliament could not do. So he was appalled to hear that the Convention regarded itself as a regular parliament, had set up committees, and concerned itself with “small matters.”²⁰ In effect, he equated the Convention with the “people” and assigned to it the role of reconstituting a government when a dissolution of government occurred.

But this view of the Convention was not entirely consistent with Locke’s political theory. In theory Locke held that government is dissolved when either the legislative or the executive violates its trust, a concept central to his response to the Revolution. He explained in the *Second Treatise* that men in a state of nature create a community by entering into a contract, but that the community entrusts power to a government in a fiduciary relationship rather than a contractual one.²¹ This meant that if the governor violated his trust, the government was dissolved and the people had the right to resist. When a dissolution occurred power reverted to the people. The key problem, of course, is the meaning of “people.” Although Locke does not specifically define the word “people,” it is certain that he, perhaps following George Lawson, did NOT equate it with a representative body.²² I take him to mean not the “lowest social classes,” as Ashcraft would have it, but rather all adult *males* who had some stake in society, men (such as artisans and tradesmen) who were outside conventional social and political elite groups.²³ In the event of a dissolution, these “people” are “at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new Legislative, differing from the other by the change of persons or Form or both.”²⁴ Clearly, Locke’s “people” in theory included many more individuals than those enfranchised in late-seventeenth-century England and thus, a large proportion of his “people” could not have been either elected to or represented in the Convention. But in a practical way Locke accepted the Convention as elected by and constituted as a surrogate for his “people.” In the preface to his *Two Treatises*

¹⁹ De Beer (ed.), *The Correspondence of John Locke*, III, 576.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 545-46.

²¹ On trust, see Laslett (ed.), *Locke’s Two Treatises of Government*, 112-16; Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke*, 162, 167, 183-84.

²² Franklin, *John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty*, 1-3 and *passim*.

²³ Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics*, 311. See Gordon J. Schochet, “Radical Politics and Ashcraft’s Treatise on Locke,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 50 (1989), 502-4.

²⁴ *Second Treatise*, ch. XIX, par. 220; cf. par. 213.

he expressed the hope that his work would “make good” King William’s title “in the consent of the people” and would justify “to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation,” words that surely referred to the work of the Convention. But Locke did not, so far as the surviving record shows, call for or regret the absence of a wider suffrage. He did not, as did the author of *A Letter To a Friend*, recommend that the Convention be enlarged to accommodate more representatives.²⁵ Rather, in a practical political way, he focused on *who* would be elected to the Convention. Twice he chastized his friend Clarke for failing to stand.²⁶

Locke’s ideas about the Convention and the people coincided with those advanced by radical pamphleteers. For example, *Advice before it be too Late* explained that supreme authority rests once more in the people as represented by the Convention, which has a “higher capacity” than a parliament, a power to make “laws for the Constitution,” whereas parliament could only make laws for the administration of government.²⁷ Other tracts agreed; one, *A Brief Collection of Some Memorandums*, described the Convention as “something greater, and of greater power than a Parliament.”²⁸ These and other pamphlets, including reprints of earlier radical tracts, talked about finding the origins of government in the “people.” An eloquent statement of that idea appeared in a reprinted tract, *Pro Popolo Adversus Tyrannos*, a reissue of John Milton’s tract *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*.²⁹

In the opening days of the Convention a few Whig MPs also voiced ideas similar to Locke’s. For example, Sir Robert Howard (one of six spokesmen promoting such notions) explained that England’s government was “grounded upon pact and covenant.” If the king breaks that pact, as

²⁵ [John Wildman], *A Letter to a Friend Advising him in this Extraordinary Juncture, how to free the Nation from slavery forever* (London, January 5, 1688/9). Locke’s view of the franchise was compatible with that of Shaftesbury. See *Some Observations Concerning the Regulating Of Elections For Parliament found among the Earl of Shaftesbury’s Papers after his Death, and now recommended to the Consideration of this present Parliament* (London, 1689).

²⁶ De Beer (ed.), *The Correspondence of John Locke*, III, 536, 546.

²⁷ John Humfrey, *Advice before it be too Late: Or, A Breviate for the Convention, Humbly Represented to the Lords and Commons of England* (London, 1689), 2-3 (unpaginated).

²⁸ *A Brief Collection of some Memorandums: or, Things humbly offered to the consideration of the Great Convention and of the succeeding Parliament* (London, 1689), 7. Also *A Letter to a Friend*, 15-16; *A Discourse Concerning the Nature, Power, And Proper Effects Of the Present Conventions In Both Kingdoms Called by the Prince of Orange, In a Letter to a Friend* (London, 1689), 16-17; *Four Questions Debated* (London, 1689), 9.

²⁹ *Pro Popolo Adversus Tyrannos; Or The Sovereign Right And Power Of The People over Tyrants, Clearly, Stated and plainly Proved. With some Reflections on the late posture of Affairs. By a true Protestant Englishman, and Well-wisher to Posterity* (London, 1689), 8, 10. The present author has compiled a list of earlier tracts that were reprinted in 1688-89.

when “he acts by his Will and not by the Laws, he is no King.” The government is “devolved into the people,” who are “now to new form themselves again, under a governor yet to be chosen.”³⁰ In agitated response, Tories such as Sir Robert Sawyer pointed out that if this were so the Convention could not be representative and that, in the absence of instructions from the electorate, could not deal with the crisis.³¹ In the House of Lords similar points were made.³² But the majority of Whigs disavowed radical notions, one M.P. indignantly declaring that the “people” were well represented by the Convention, which spoke for all who “are fit to have a share in [the government.]”³³

Locke opposed the Convention’s transforming itself into a parliament because, by doing so, it would lose its special character. This attitude aligned him with Tories and radical Whigs against King William and court Whigs, who moved immediately to regularize the Convention’s status.³⁴ Yet when the Convention became a Parliament on February 23, Locke preserved a positive attitude. In a letter he expressed admiration for the “designes” William “has soe gloriously began” and affirmed his desire to assist in seeing those designs “completed.”³⁵ This is the viewpoint of a man with practical political sense.

A second issue at the time of the Revolution was the headship of the state. Locke’s position was that James II had broken the trust between himself and his people and therefore was no longer king; he had actually put “himself into a State of War with his People.”³⁶ This attitude reflected political principles and examples spelled out in the *Second Treatise*. There Locke argued that a dissolution of government followed when the Executive, for example, set up “his own Arbitrary Will, as the law of the Society,” corrupted the election process by “Sollicitations, Threats, Promises or otherwise” of the representatives, or turned over the government to a foreign power.³⁷ Locke’s points correlate with steps James II had indeed taken, as in his use of the suspending and dispensing powers and of *quo warranto* procedures and wholesale purges of borough and county

³⁰ Anchitell Grey, *Debates of the House of Commons* (10 vols., London, 1763), IX, 19-20; Schwoerer, “A Journall of the Convention at Westminster,” 250-51. See also Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights, 1689*, 176-77, n.46.

³¹ Schwoerer, “A Journall,” 252-53; Grey, *Debates*, IX, 22.

³² For the debate in the House of Lords, see Danby’s notes reprinted in Henry Horwitz, “Parliament and the Glorious Revolution,” *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 47 (1974), 36-52, and Schwoerer, *The Declaration of Rights, 1689*, 205-8, 214.

³³ Schwoerer, “A Journall,” 254-55, 256; Grey, *Debates*, IX, 17-19, 22.

³⁴ De Beer (ed.), *The Correspondence of John Locke*, III, 545-46. See Lois G. Schwoerer, “The Transformation of the 1689 Convention into a Parliament,” *Parliamentary History*, 3 (1984), 57-76.

³⁵ De Beer (ed.), *The Correspondence of John Locke*, III, 575-76.

³⁶ *Second Treatise*, ch. XVIII, par. 205; also Laslett (ed.), *Locke’s Two Treatises of Government*, 114.

³⁷ *Second Treatise*, ch. XIX, pars. 216, 217, 219, 221.

governments. The fear, moreover, was general that James was prepared to deliver the nation into the hands of the Pope and/or France. Later, in unpublished papers, Locke specifically charged James with possessing a “naturall aversion” to the nation’s “libertys and religion” and predicted that if he ever returned, “Jesuits must governe and France be our master.”³⁸ He also likened James’s grant of toleration to the favor of a stepmother who really intends that favor to harm her stepchildren.³⁹ In effect Locke pinned the evil acts on James himself not his ministers and thereby rejected the old legal dictum, “The King Can Do No Wrong.”

James’s “miscarriages,” as Locke termed the king’s actions, were essential to Locke’s theory in several ways. First, they justified the removal of James. As Locke put it, if there were no miscarriages, “our complaints were mutiny and our redemption rebellion and we ought to returne as fast as we can to our old obedience.”⁴⁰ In other words James’s acts broke the fiduciary relationship between king and people and left the throne “vacant”; they were tantamount to an “abdication.” This view aligned Locke with left-wing Whigs. Recently, scholars have aired the possible meanings of the words “abdication” and “vacancy,” forgetting perhaps that obfuscation was calculated and that it forwarded agreement.⁴¹ Briefly, if “abdication” meant that James’s flight was voluntary, then the throne was vacant only with respect to him and should descend according to divine right succession (assuming always that James’s baby son was fraudulent). But if “abdication” rested on James’s *acts*, the implication was that the original contract (as some people understood it) or the trust relationship between King and People (as Locke and others insisted)⁴² was broken, the throne was entirely vacant, and the Convention was responsible for filling it. The latter conception the Convention finally accepted. The implications are radical but less so than the idea that the “people” *deposed* the king. Rather James himself was responsible for the dissolution of the government.

The first draft of the “Abdication” and “Vacancy” formula was compatible with Locke’s ideas even though the word “contract” not “trust” appeared. Ignoring problems of syntax, the draft spoke of James II’s “breaking the original contract between king and people,” and “having

³⁸ Farr and Roberts, “A Rediscovered Document,” 395.

³⁹ P.R.O., PRO 30/24/47/6, John Locke, “Old England’s Legal Constitution,” 7.

⁴⁰ Farr and Roberts, “A Rediscovered Document,” 396.

⁴¹ Thomas P. Slaughter, “‘Abdicate’ and ‘Contract’ in the Glorious Revolution,” *Historical Journal*, 24 (1981), 323-37; John Miller, “The Glorious Revolution: ‘Contract’ and ‘Abdication’ Reconsidered.” *Ibid.*, 25 (1982), 541-55; Slaughter, “‘Abdicate’ and ‘Contract’ Restored,” *Ibid.*, 28 (1985), 399-403. See also Schworer, “A Journall of the Convention at Westminster,” 260; Schworer, *The Declaration of Rights, 1689*, 219; cf. 215.

⁴² In Locke’s theory people enter into a contract to create society, but into a fiduciary relationship or trust to create a government. For the trust idea in the Convention, see Schworer, “A Journall of the Convention at Westminster,” 255.

violated the fundamental laws,” thus leaving the throne “vacant.” However, following a compromise between Tories and Whigs, the language about “original contract” and “breaking the fundamental laws” was dropped, leaving an ambiguous formula, which surely disappointed Locke.

The idea that James’s acts had caused a dissolution of government *before* William reached England reinforced two other interrelated points important to Locke: the destruction of the idea of divine right succession and the rejection of the Regency proposal. The former was intolerable because it admitted of “noe controul.” The latter was also intolerable because it would have preserved James on the throne, while William wore the crown.⁴³

James’s “miscarriages” also justified elevating William to the throne and securing his title as *de jure*, not *de facto*, on the basis of conquest. As Locke put it, the “miscarriages” “gave a rise and right to King William’s comeing” with an army “when noething less could doe.” Therefore, William was no usurper, as Louis XIV would have it. Further, William’s title was “of right” because based on the nation’s laws and liberties: as Prince, William had accepted the Declaration of Rights at the presentation ceremony on February 13, and, as King, at the Coronation ceremony on April 11 he had taken a specially designed oath to uphold the laws of the nation. Locke’s justification of William’s title on the basis of law connected with a principle in the *Second Treatise*, that allegiance is due to the “Supreme Executor” who commands allegiance as the executor of the law.⁴⁴

In discussing the new government, Locke focussed on William to the exclusion of Mary, an attitude that aligned him with a very small number of radical Whig tract writers and members of the Convention who wanted to elevate William alone.⁴⁵ The preface to *Two Treatises* referred only to “our great restorer, our present King William,” with no mention of Queen Mary. Why should Locke have ignored Mary? By doing so he underscored the demise of the doctrine of divine right, inflated the role of the Convention, and contemned the Tories, a few of whom wanted to elevate Mary as queen with William as her consort and all of whom wanted a role for Mary. That compromise resulted in the creation of a dual monarchy, a constitutional arrangement, unique in English history, in which the regal authority was lodged in William’s hands alone. Locke must have taken satisfaction in observing that the Coronation ceremony (which he probably attended) contained subtle indications that Mary’s status was not quite equal to her husband’s.⁴⁶

⁴³ Farr and Roberts, “A Rediscovered Document,” 394, 396.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 397; *Second Treatise*, ch. XIII, par. 151.

⁴⁵ *Reasons Humbly Offer’d, for Placing his Highness The Prince of Orange, Singly, in the Throne, during Life* (1689); Schwoerer, “A Journall of the Convention at Westminster,” 255.

⁴⁶ De Beer (ed.), *The Correspondence of John Locke*, III, 596-97; Lois G. Schwoerer, “Images of Queen Mary II, 1689-95,” *Renaissance Quarterly*, 42 (1989), 717-48.