By Juha Räikkä, Jukka Varelius
This quantity gathers jointly formerly unpublished articles targeting the connection among choice edition and autonomy in reference to human enhancement and within the end-of-life context. the price of person autonomy is a cornerstone of liberal societies. whereas there are diversified conceptions of the proposal, it's controversial that on any believable knowing of person autonomy an self sustaining agent must take into consideration the stipulations that circumscribe its activities. but it has additionally been urged that permitting one’s techniques to impact one’s personal tastes threatens autonomy. whereas this phenomenon has obtained a few recognition in different parts of ethical philosophy, it has seldom been thought of in bioethics. This e-book combines for the 1st time the themes of choice version, person autonomy, and selecting to die or to reinforce human capacities in a different and finished quantity, filling a big wisdom hole within the modern bioethics literature.
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Additional resources for Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life
But I should distinguish the problem of normative authority that results from problems of adaptation from the problem of normative authority that results from other sorts of preference failures. Adaptation is not the only feature of a preference that generates a lack of normative authority. Preferences can lack normative 1 See, for instance, Nussbaum (2000, Ch. 2) for a critique of preferences rather than capabilities as the proper index of social choice. I criticize Nussbaum’s position in Dorsey (2012).
So on the view of the objector according to which the non-autonomy of the earlier preference is inherited by later preferences, the preference I express on my 110th birthday for chocolate cake with vanilla icing rather than grasshopper cake with chicken feathers on top is non-autonomous, even if I am dialogically reflective about this preference, as we might expect me to be. Along with the grasshopper cake, the view that none of my preferences as a 110-year old are autonomously retained, and so none of my actions are autonomous, seems too hard to swallow.
There’s another way to see this point. , moral demands, the requirements of respect for others, or some (independent of preference) measure of the objective good. But adaptation seems different: adaptive preferences do not (or do not necessarily) fail to conform to some external measure, but rather with an internal measure. But what is this internal measure? Surely adaptive preferences do not lack normative authority because they do not measure up to what I previously valued; this would render virtually all instances of changed preferences normative failures.